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Abstract—Blockchain’s evolution during the past decade is
astonishing: from bitcoin to over 2.000 altcoins, and from
decentralised electronic payments to transactions programmable
by smart contracts and complex tokens governed by decentralised
organisations. While the new generation of blockchain appli-
cations is still evolving, blockchain’s technical characteristics
are also advancing. Yet, immutability, a hitherto indisputable
property according to which blockchain data cannot be edited
nor deleted, remains the cornerstone of blockchain’s security.
Nevertheless, blockchain’s immutability is being called into ques-
tion lately in the light of the new erasing requirements imposed
by the GDPR’s “Right to be Forgotten (RtbF)” provision. As the
RtbF obliges blockchain data to be editable in order restricted
content redactions, modifications or deletions to be applied
when requested, blockchains compliance with the regulation
is indeed challenging, if not impracticable. Towards resolving
this contradiction, various methods and techniques for mutable
blockchains have been proposed in an effort to satisfy regulatory
erasing requirements while preserving blockchains’ security. To
this end, this work aims to provide a comprehensive review on the
state-of-the-art research approaches, technical workarounds and
advanced cryptographic techniques that have been put forward
to resolve this conflict and to discuss their potentials, constraints
and limitations when applied in the wild to either permissioned
or permissionless blockchains.
Index Terms—Blockchain, immutability, Right to be forgotten,
GDPR
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology dominates today’s news, discus-
sions, and articles, whereas its initiatives proliferate across
industry and academia. Yet, few technologies today are as
misunderstood as blockchain. For some, blockchain is just a
hype, an immature solution [1], an exaggerated bubble [2],
or even a crypto-medieval system [3]. For others, it is an
undeniably ingenious invention, an advance, a revolutionary
technology. Blockchain’s technological breakthrough has been
even compared to the one brought by the use of the TCP/IP
to modern computing or the one Linux brought to modern
application development [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. In addition, the
bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency that exploits blockchains, has
been called as “digital gold” [9], while ethereum, the largest
open-source blockchain-based distributed computing platform,
has been characterised as the backbone of the new Internet
[10].
Even though its underlying technology existed long before
Satoshi Nakamoto published his paper on bitcoin [11], the
immense and profound impact the bitcoin had in financial
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trades worldwide revealed blockchain as a new highly promis-
ing direction for decentralised computing. In the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis where consumers’ trust in banking
was shaken, bitcoin’s notion of decentralised financial systems
seemed particularly appealing. Nevertheless, while blockchain
technology is commonly associated with bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies, these are just the forerunners of a whole new
wave of blockchain applications. According to experts, apart
from disrupting financial services, blockchain could end up
transforming a number of important industries, from healthcare
to politics, whereas has the potential to create new foundations
for economic and social systems [12], [5], [13]. As most of
its broad possible applications are still emerging, the future
orientation and impact of blockchain technology cannot be
easily predicted. Still, its first stages of development during
its decadal lifetime are beyond any expectations.
Undoubtedly, blockchain’s substantial impact on current and
future real-world applications is attributed to its most profound
quality, its trustlessness. Trustlessness stems from blockchains’
inherent security and transparency which eliminate the need
for a third party intermediation and trust among users in
decentralised and untrusted environments [14]. A fundamental
property that underpins the blockchain’s secure and transparent
nature, and therefore guarantees its transactional integrity and
auditability, is immutability. Blockchain’s immutability certi-
fies that transaction data residing in blockchains are tampered-
proof, i.e. they can neither be removed nor mutated. However,
this append-only data structure signifies the permanent storage
and availability of the stored information to everyone in the
blockchain network. Clearly, this property, albeit desirable in
some contexts, contradicts several privacy requirements and
data protection rights when personal data are at stake. Among
others, it clearly challenges the Right to be Forgotten (RtbF)
defined in the new European data protection regulation, the
GDPR, according to which individuals have the right to delete
their personal data if certain conditions apply [15].
Acknowledging the above contradiction, considerable re-
search is carried out nowadays to design and develop methods
for allowing the modification or deletion of blockchain data
while maintaining its security, auditability and transparency.
As the conflict around blockchain’s immutability may affect
the adoption of blockchains substantially to a broad area of
applications, we believe that resolving such disputed areas will
be to the advantage of both academia and industry. To that end,
this paper aims to provide a comprehensive review on the
state-of-the-art research approaches, technical workarounds
and advanced cryptographic techniques that have been put
forward to resolve this conflict and to discuss their potentials,
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2constraints and limitations when applied in the wild to either
permissioned or permissionless blockchain settings.
The rest of the work is structured as follows. Since the
heart of blockchain lies in the decentralisation, in the fol-
lowing section we describe the decentralised architecture in
terms of blockchain technology. Next, we present blockchain’s
key characteristics relevant to our work, namely permissions,
consensus protocols, trustlessness, privacy, transparency, and
most importantly, immutability. In section 4, we discuss the
collision of blockchain’s immutability with the GDPR’s RtbF,
whereas in section 5 we review the currently employed tech-
nical methods and the state-of-the-art techniques introduced
to comply blockchains with the erasing requirements of the
RtbF. The paper concludes by discussing the tension around
blockchain’s evolution and the respective challenges in terms
of its alignment with the RtbF.
II. DECENTRALIZED ARCHITECTURES
Although the hype of decentralisation has been demon-
strated during the late years by the boom of Distributed Ledger
Technologies (DLTs), decentralisation of information systems
is not a new idea. Even from the early 70’s distributed and
decentralised architectures were introduced to eliminate the
problem of single point of failure and to increase systems’
robustness. It is worth pointing out, however, that while
the terms decentralized and distributed are commonly used
interchangeably to denote the lack of a central point of control,
they actually have a subtle different meaning; the former is
used to describe the conceptual and logical model of control,
while the latter describes the technical characteristics of the
infrastructure used to be built upon [16].
Since the dawn of online social networking, decentralisation
has also been proposed as an alternative for enhanced privacy
and personal sovereignty in online social context [17]. In
recent years, decentralisation has been re-introduced as a mean
to assure the reliability of non-trusted environments such as
those of electronic currencies, i.e. cryptocurrencies. Nowa-
days, cryptocurrencies are usually discussed in the context of
blockchains and distributed ledger technologies, terms closely
interrelated but not identical. In what follows, we summarise
and clarify the notions of DLT, blockchain and cryptocurrency
and highlight their respective differences.
A. DLT
A DLT is a distributed digital ledger stored on a network
of machines. Any changes to the ledger are reflected simul-
taneously for all holders of the ledger while the information
stored is authenticated by a cryptographic signature [18]. The
decentralized nature of the DLT eliminates the need for a
central authority or intermediary to process, validate or au-
thenticate transactions. At their core, DLTs are data structures
to record transactions and set of functions to manipulate
them. While each DLT differentiates itself using different data
model and technologies, generally all DLTs are based on three
well-known technologies: public key cryptography; distributed
peer-to-peer networks; and consensus mechanisms. All three
are blended in a unique and novel way to operate in an
untrusted decentralised environment [19].
B. Blockchains
Even though blockchain technology was first outlined in
1991 as an effort to implement a system where document
timestamps could not be tampered with [20], it was not until
January 2009 that blockchain attracted worldwide attention
when its first real-world application, the bitcoin cryptocur-
rency, was launched [11]. Although the terms DLT and
blockchain are often used interchangeably in the literature,
they are not equivalent. For instance, while a blockchain is a
sequence of blocks, DLTs do not require such a chain. As a
matter of fact, a blockchain is just one type of DLT formed by
a linked list (chain) of blocks connected to each other using
hash codes, where each block references the previous block
in the chain. Each block may contain a series of transactions
which can be data of any sort. In blockchains, the transaction
data are continuously appended, and they can be accessed by
all the network participants (nodes). Essentially, blockchains
are distributed and immutable ledgers that store transactions
history while they provide a set of features that differentiate
them from the other DLTs: smart contracts, which are pieces
of executable code residing on the blockchain and executed
once specific conditions are met; and miners, which are mining
new transactions into the blockchain and can benefit financially
from these mining activities [19].
C. Cryptocurrencies
While there have been multiple attempts during the last
30 years to solve the complex issues surrounding digital
currencies [21], [22], [23], this was not achieved before 2009
when the bitcoin was launched. Generally speaking, the term
cryptocurrency refers to a decentralised cryptography-based
currency. Cryptocurrencies can be seen as asset resources or
tokens on a blockchain network, and they are just one of the
many possible applications of blockchain. Arguably, the true
value of blockchain technology goes far beyond cryptocur-
rencies, whereas a blockchain can stand on its own just fine
- no cryptocurrency needed [24]. In fact, there are already
blockchain frameworks without any built-in cryptocurrency
[25]. Yet, cryptocurrencies currently underlie most of the
public blockchain applications to facilitate and incentivise their
transactions.
Although bitcoin is currently the dominant cryptocurrency
used in decentralised payments, the number of alternative
cryptocurrencies (altcoins) has already surpassed 2.000 [26].
In the context of cryptocurrencies like bitcoin, the name refers
to more than the underlying technology since it can also
be used to denote the protocol, the software system that
transfers the money over the blockchain ledger, as well as
the token, i.e. the currency itself that is traded in transactions
or exchanges [5]. Nevertheless, while referring to the token
as the technology can be right in the case of bitcoin, this is
not the case when dealing with other blockchain projects like
ethereum [27] where the technology is known as ethereum,
the native token is ether, and transactions are paid in gas.
III. BLOCKCHAIN CHARACTERISTICS
Over the last few years, blockchain is rapidly moving
from the fat protocols stage, where all value is generated
3in the protocol layer, into the fat Decentralised Applications
(DApps) stage where transactions are programmable by smart
contracts, and complex tokens are governed by Decentralised
Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) [5], [28]. As this new
generation of applications is evolving, blockchain’s technical
characteristics and specifications are becoming even more
advanced and sophisticated [12]. By all means, describing in
detail all the blockchain’s features and functions is beyond
the scope of this paper. Instead, for the sake of simplicity, we
delve into blockchain’s characteristics that are relevant to our
following discussion regarding blockchain’s immutability and
its collision with the RtbF.
A. Permissionless and permissioned blockchains
Typically, there are two types of blockchains: permissionless
and permissioned. A permissionless blockchain is considered
a public one in the sense that anyone can be a node and
interact with the network by either submitting transactions,
and hence adding entries to the ledger, or participating in
the process of transaction verification and block mining, or
even creating smart contracts. In other words, anyone can read
the chain and write a new block into the chain. In contrast,
permissioned blockchains limit the parties who can transact
on the blockchain and can contribute to its state. Actually,
in a permissioned blockchain, only a restricted set of users
have the rights to see the recorded history, to validate the
block transactions, to issue transactions of their own, or to
create smart contracts. Permissioned blockchains can be either
private or consortium blockchains. A private blockchain is
fully controlled by an organisation and only nodes from this
specific organisation could determine the final consensus. Sev-
eral organisations construct a consortium blockchain and only
a group of pre-selected nodes are responsible for validating
the blocks, and thus for participating in its consensus process
[29]. Apparently, permissioned blockchains, acting as closed
ecosystems in which some central authorities control participa-
tion, cannot be regarded as fully decentralised networks since a
minimum level of trust among the nodes is sustained. Instead,
consortium blockchains are regarded as partially decentralised,
while private blockchains have been compared to centralised
networks, and even to distributed databases [30].
Permissionless blockchains usually employ fat protocols
that compensate network contributors with tokens. On the
other hand, permissioned blockchains generally do not need
to employ a cryptocurrency model or monetary tokens due to
the nature of these business networks. Nonetheless, both types
of blockchains have their own advantages and disadvantages
and can be suitable for different kind of situations. Although it
may seem that in an institutional context private blockchains is
unquestionably a better choice, it has been argued that public
blockchains operating within or across organisations still have
a lot to offer [31].
B. Maintaining trust through consensus protocols
In view of the fact that a third party is no longer needed in
a blockchain to verify data integrity and to maintain trust, as
opposed to the centralised architectures, consensus algorithms
are used to maintain data consistency [29]. To put it another
way, a consensus protocol allows all nodes of the blockchain,
and the DLTs in general, to agree on a single version of the
truth, i.e. on the transactions and the order in which these
are listed on the newly-mined block, without the need of a
trusted third party. Otherwise, the individual copies of the
ledger will diverge and it will end up with branches, called
forks, of the chain; the nodes will have a different view of
the global state [24]. As previously mentioned, while every
node in a permissionless blockchain could take part in the
consensus process, only a selected set of nodes are responsible
for validating the block in a permissioned blockchain. Some
of the main consensus protocols used as of today are Proof of
Work (PoW), Proof of Stake (PoS), Delegated Proof-of-Stake
(DPoS), Proof of Authority (PoA), and Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (PBFT).
In PoW, which is the underlying consensus of the bitcoin,
several nodes of the distributed ledger, called miners, compete
to solve a complicated mathematical problem, that is to
calculate a hash value of the block header equal to or smaller
than a threshold, and hence to validate a block of transactions.
Once the first miner finds a solution, it broadcast it to the other
nodes which then verify the solution by mutually confirming
the correctness of the hash value. If all the nodes agree on
the solution, the consensus is reached, and the new block is
appended to all the ledgers held by the nodes of the network.
The idea is that the solution to the problem is hard to find but
easy to verify by the rest of the network. While there might be
cases of multiple nodes finding a solution nearly at the same
time, and hence valid blocks to be generated simultaneously
resulting thereby in forks, these cases are extremely unlikely,
albeit not impossible [32]. Nevertheless, a chain that becomes
longer thereafter is judged as the authentic one. The PoW is
characterised by its high energy consumption, since a huge
amount of computational power is required for solving the
mathematical puzzle to mine a block. Moreover, in PoW
there is always the possibility of the formation of mining
pools, i.e. groups of miners who pool their resources together
and potentially could control the network. In PoS, which is
regarded as an energy-saving alternative to PoW, miners have
to prove the ownership of the amount of currency since it
is believed that people with more currencies would be less
likely to attack the network [29]. DPoS is a more efficient PoS
mechanism that uses a reputation system and real-time voting
to achieve consensus. Nodes vote for representatives to secure
their network and representatives are rewardedbyvalidating
transactionsforthenextblock. In PoA, transactions are validated
by approved accounts, known as validators. By attaching a
reputation to an identity, validators are incentivised to uphold
the transaction process, to avoid having their identities linked
to a negative reputation. PBFT reach a consensus without the
energy consumption required by PoW. The consensus decision
is determined based on the total decisions submitted by all the
nodes and the honest nodes come to an agreement of the state
of the system through a majority.
By definition, consensus protocols in permissionless
blockchains promote and establish decentralised trust in non
trusted environments. This is the result of their employed
4incentive mechanisms which rely mostly on game-theoretic
principles for the correct operation and assume absolute non-
trust among the participants. Instead, the consensus protocols
operate on the assumption that all miners behave in a way
that is profitable to them [33]. In an ideal scenario where there
would be a minimum level of trust, all validating nodes would
vote on the order of transactions for the next block, and they
would go with what the majority decides [24]. However, due
to the complete absence of trust in permissionless blockchains,
nodes cannot rely on each other, and therefore, they are
rewarded with incentives for correct behaviour to collectively
agree on the state of the ledger [33]. In PoW for instance,
if a malicious user tries to subvert the system by creating
a fork and entering into a race with other miners to create
an alternate ledger, the resulting computational cost will be
tremendous, even in the case of winning. Instead, if the
same work is directed towards honest mining, it can possibly
result in bigger profits by way of incentives. Hence, trying to
defraud the system is generally not in one’s interest. This is
why the trustlessness of PoW consensus mechanism, which
makes no assumptions about the honesty or reliability of
participants, is currently considered more suitable for permis-
sionless blockchains. On the contrary, due to the risk of Sybil
attacks public blockchains cannot rely on the PBFT consensus
algorithm which requires a majority of honest nodes: even
when there is only one malicious participant, it can create
multiple fake identities, get multiple votes, and thus influence
the network to favour its interests, forcing the number of
honest nodes to a minority [33], [24].
The consensus mechanisms employed in permissioned
blockchains can be the same as in permissionless networks or
can be completely uniquely designed (e.g. authority-based). In
fact, it has been argued that consensus based on cryptocur-
rency is unsustainable for enterprise use and permissioned
blockchains [34]. For instance, Hyperledger Fabric [35], a
permissioned blockchain infrastructure oriented towards en-
terprises, does not require a built-in cryptocurrency because
consensus is not reached via mining [36]. Generally speak-
ing, given the trusted model of permissioned blockchains
and the known identities of the network participants, the
consensus mechanisms used are computationally inexpensive
when compared to PoW as there is no need for protection
through mining. In fact, private blockchains are far less costly
to operate since, as long as the majority of validators are
following the rules, blocks only need a simple digital signature
from the nodes that approve them instead of expensive con-
sensus protocols [37]. Most common voting-based consensus
protocols preferred by permissioned blockchains are based on
the family protocols of Paxos and PBFT [33], [38], [39]. Given
the extensive length of consensuses used in DLTs and the
peculiarities of each one, only the main consensus protocols
employed in blockchains were briefly mentioned here. The
interested reader may further refer to [29], [39], [40]. A brief
categorisation of blockchains based on some of their basic
characteristics is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Blockchain categorisation.
C. Privacy and transparency
By design, blockchains are based on the principle of com-
plete transparency according to which transactions, even if
they hashed or encrypted, are visible to all participating nodes
so that they can be validated [24]. Therefore, since the content
of every transaction is exposed to every node on the network,
transactional privacy in blockchains is hard to be attained.
Nevertheless, in permissioned blockchains where the nodes
are known, privacy and confidentiality are usually preserved
much more efficiently than in permissionless settings through
the use of access control policies. On the other hand, while
user accounts in permissionless blockchains can largely stay
anonymous, and as such are thought to provide a series of
privacy benefits to their users, many studies have demonstrated
that there are still considerable risks to users’ privacy [41],
[42], [29], [43], [44]. For instance, research has shown that
even when users are hiding behind multiple pseudonyms, these
can be correlated and often identify them [45], [41], [46],
[47]. Adding to this the fact that transactions are linked, one
can retrieve the full history of all transactions performed on a
blockchain [45].
Due to the transparent and permanent nature of blockchain
technology which obliges data to be stored forever and to be
publicly available to the entire network, putting personal data
on blockchains has been broadly discouraged. As it has been
argued, storing personal data into blockchains it is like having
again “Cambridge Analytica” - a severe surveillance scandal
- but on the blockchain [2]. Nevertheless, blockchains do not
have to expose personal data directly to reveal individuals’
personal information. By exploiting metadata information and
by applying big data analytics potentially sensitive information
can also be retrieved, e.g. recording visits to health practition-
ers may reveal sensitive details on someone’s health status
[43]. As it has been demonstrated in the literature, achieving
privacy in a lightweight and flexible manner for all DLTs, in
general, is still an open research question [29]. That being said,
it is worth noting that privacy was never one of blockchain’s
original problems to be addressed. As Buterin, the founder
of the ethereum blockchain puts it, “blockchains do not solve
privacy issues, and are an authenticity solution only” [48].
In spite of this limitation, several approaches based on
cryptographic techniques such as homomorphic encryption,
5zero-knowledge proofs [49] and secure Multi Party Computa-
tion (MPC) [50] have been proposed to address transactional
privacy in blockchains. Broadly speaking, these techniques en-
able specific computations to be performed without revealing
the inputs and outputs of those computations. These methods,
however, are resource intensive so it is almost impossible to be
implemented at scale [24]. Tumblers or mixing services have
also been used intensively lately as a mean to provide strong
notions of anonymity in public blockchain networks [51].
D. Blockchain immutability
Immutability, or irreversibility, is a fundamental blockchain
property that stems from the fact that transactions cannot
be edited or deleted once they are successfully verified and
recorded into the blockchain. This property is the consequence
of the cryptographically linked blocks which are chained
together with the hash value of the preceding (parent) block.
In particular, each block contains a reference to the preceding
block by including in its header a cryptographic hash of the
transaction data within the preceding block. This cryptographic
hash is actually calculated using a Merkle tree on all the
transactions of the block. A Merkle tree is a data structure
constructed by recursively hashing pairs of transactions until
there is only one hash, called the Merkle root. Merkle trees
are used in bitcoin to summarize all the transactions in a
block, producing an overall digital fingerprint of the entire
set of transactions, providing thus a very efficient process to
verify whether a transaction is included in a block without
the need for a complete local copy of all transactions. Since
the root is known and secured through the mining process,
branches can be loaded on demand from untrusted sources.
The cryptographic hash algorithm used in bitcoins merkle trees
is SHA256 applied twice, also known as double-SHA256.
In bitcoin blockchains, simplified payment verification (SPV)
based on Merkle tree is used in order to keep the size and the
computational effort low, whereas in ethereum a variation of
Patricia Merkle Tree is used.
In simpler terms, the Merkle root which comprises the
information from all transactions of a given block, is included
in the block header of the subsequent (child) block. Bearing
in mind the collision-resistant property of the hash functions,
any change of the transaction data in a block will change the
hash of this block and, to maintain the integrity of the parent-
child reference, will necessitate a change in its reference
within its child block. This cascade effect ensures that once a
block has many generations following it, it cannot be changed
without forcing a recalculation of all subsequent blocks since
such a recalculation would require enormous computation [52]
for Proof of Work-based protocols. The longest the chain of
blocks a blockchain has, the more resilient the blockchain is to
data tampering attacks because if an adversary modifies data
anywhere in the blockchain, it will result in the hash pointer in
the subsequent block being incorrect [53], [45]. Therefore, for
properly deployed blockchains, data residing in blockchains
cannot be ever mutated or removed. Even though tampering
with data already stored in the blockchain is not possible, data
can be appended to the blockchains. Therefore, blockchains
are known as append-only, tampered-proof and immutable
data structures. Inevitably, since blockchain’s immutability as-
sures its transactional integrity, i.e. the correct and permanent
storage of blocks and transactions within the blockchain, it
is of paramount importance to blockchain’s security and a
cornerstone of its highly praised values of trustlessness and
censorship-resistance.
While, as demonstrated, it is impossible to delete, update or
rollback transactions once they are included in a blockchain,
some would argue otherwise: considering that immutability
is an emergent, and not intrinsic, property of a blockchain
data structure, and therefore an agent or set of agents with a
sufficient amount of computing power can modify it, stating
that a blockchain is by default immutable is incorrect and
misleading [54], [55], [56]. Especially in the context of per-
missioned blockchains where the number of nodes is limited,
tampering with blockchain data should not be regarded as
impossible since there is always a possibility of the majority
of the consortium or the dominant organisation nodes to vote
for their version of truth and to amend the ledger accordingly
[29], [57]. Hence, although in public blockchains the existence
of a long chain of blocks makes the blockchain’s deep history
immutable due to the extremely high cost involved for altering
the hash-based integrity of the blocks, ensuring immutability
in private blockchains is much cheaper and stronger, as long
as the majority of validating nodes are following the rules
[37], [52]. However, it has been argued that even in public
blockchains there is no such thing as perfect immutability
since under certain conditions a particular blockchain can
be changed [37]. Although events such as the Ethereum
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) fork clearly
align with such claims [58], these hard forks are exceptionally
rare and definitely cannot be applied on a regular basis. Hence,
it is commonly held that altering transactional data in public
blockchains is thus far practically impossible.
IV. BLOCKCHAIN IMMUTABILITY AND THE RIGHT TO BE
FORGOTTEN
Blockchains by definition are unable to forget since tamper-
ing with transactional data stored in blockchains has been iden-
tified as nearly impossible [55]. Indubitably, this immutable
and transparent record keeping of blockchain data facilitates
the movement and storage of information in a secure, auditable
and credible way, and consequently guarantees blockchains’
credibility, persistency and security. Despite its apparent bene-
fits, blockchain immutability also has some unintended conse-
quences such as when erroneous or illegal content is stored in
the blockchain [33]. Likewise, as already discussed in Section
3.3, blockchain immutability presents several risks to people’s
privacy. More precisely, immutability’s collision with privacy
and data protection rights renders absolute immutability a
major barrier to blockchain’s adoption when personal data
are at stake [59]. In this regard, immutability, a hitherto
indisputable property and the cornerstone of blockchain’s
security, is being called into question in the light of the erasing
requirements imposed from the recently adopted European
data protection regulation, the GDPR. Although the GDPR
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data and offers extended legal rights to individuals residing
in the EU, in its provided recitals and articles it does not
take into account decentralised technologies such as DLTs and
blockchains. On the one hand, this was because regulators
deliberately chose to follow a technology-agnostic approach
in order not to bind the provisions of the law with current
trends and state-of-the-art technologies in computer science
[60]. On the other hand, however, this was because over
the long period under which the final GDPR text was being
debated and finalised, blockchain technology has not been a
widespread technological trend that is these days. As a result,
various legal and technical divergences and incompatibilities
between the GDPR and the blockchain technology have been
unavoidably identified [55], [59], [61], [62], [63].
Of the GDPR’s provisions, the most profound and con-
troversial one is the Article 17 that anticipates the Right to
be Forgotten (RtbF), namely the possibility of individuals
to request the erasure of their personal data when certain
conditions are met (Article 17(1)). In particular, the RtbF
entails the permanent deletion of personal data upon request
and from all the places to which they have been disseminated
[60]. As already thoroughly discussed and analysed in previous
works, the impact of encompassing the RtbF on contemporary
information systems is immense, whereas its integration into
the design of future technological developments is currently
disputable [60], [64]. Blockchain technology, due to its im-
mutability, is one such advanced development that contradicts
the RtbF. Although one might argue that anonymizing personal
data residing in blockchains through public key cryptography
is a reasonable step for blockchain data to fall outside of
the scope of GDPR, it should be outlined that private and
public keys as well as hashed data are pseudonymous, not
anonymous, and therefore also qualify as personal data under
the GDPR (since pseudonymous data are still personal and
consequently they are not exempted from the Regulation
(Article 4(1))) [65], [60], [55]. Put differently, blockchain
compliance with the GDPR only through the use of hash
values and public key cryptography cannot be guaranteed [59].
Taking further into account that data stored in blockchains are
never completely anonymous (Section 3.3), it is apparent that
the RtbF strikes at the heart of the blockchain’s immutability
property.
Against this background, CNIL, the French Data Protection
Authority, notes that it is technically impossible to grant
the data subject’s request for erasure when data is entered
in the blockchain. In fact, while the CNIL recognises that
there are some cryptographic methods that may make the data
“almost inaccessible”, it still questions the extent to which
these solutions provide full compliance with the GDPR since
the solutions do not “strictly speaking, result in an erasure of
the data insofar as the data would still exist in the blockchain”
[66], [67]. Along the same lines, the European Data Protec-
tion Supervisor (EDPS) stresses the importance of enabling
the manageability of the personal data, i.e. their alteration,
deletion, and selective disclosure, as a mean to maintain
people’s privacy [68]. Furthermore, a recent resolution from
the European Parliament on DLTs and blockchains raises the
need for blockchain applications to be compliant with the
GDPR, stressing the fact that the RtbF is not easily applicable
to this technology [69].
Inevitably, the RtbF has been seen by many blockchain
advocates and crypto activists as an obstacle for expanding the
blockchain technology to a broad area of applications. Still,
others have argued that approaches for adding preapproved,
limited, and transparent methods to alter data on an immutable
system is a trade-off necessary to be able to utilise the
advantages of the blockchain technology [59], [61]. In this
respect, the World Economic Forum has sounded the alarm
about the struggling of blockchain innovation due to the GDPR
and urged for flexible policy frameworks to allow the benefits
of data and technology to be realised [70]. Ideally, for enabling
data deletion, the participants of a blockchain would have to
agree on an effective process to jointly execute a lawful request
to erase personal data from the decentralised ledgers [71]. As
already discussed, in permissioned blockchains where there
are specific entities (authorities or enterprises) in charge and
legally accountable, introducing mutability in the blockchain
without interrupting its functionality should not be considered
an impossible task [57], [29]. In this perspective and in the
context of permissioned blockchains, the term “pragmatic
immutability” has been coined to pave the way for greater
blockchain adoption outside the world of cryptocurrency [72].
However, introducing mutability in permissionless
blockchains is rather challenging due to the absolute lack of
trust among the participants. Yet, there exist optimistic voices
that put their faith in advanced cryptographic techniques to
guarantee individual privacy in decentralised architectures
such as blockchains [43]. With this in mind, several
research works have been carried out lately in an attempt to
conform blockchains to the RtbF erasing requirements and to
consequently adjust them to privacy-intensive applications.
Among others, these works include technical workarounds
and advanced cryptographic methods to either bypass or
remove blockchain immutability both for permissioned and
permissionless blockchains. The state-of-the-art of these
works is discussed hereafter.
V. CURRENT EFFORTS FOR BALANCING IMMUTABILITY
AND THE RTBF
To address privacy issues arising from blockchains, and
particularly to tackle the controversy around blockchain’s
immutability and the RtbF, various approaches have been
embraced by researchers and information technologists. These
approaches focus on either circumventing or conditionally
removing blockchain’s immutability. An overview of these
solutions is illustrated in Figure 2.
A. Bypassing blockchain’s immutability
A common workaround suggested throughout the literature
for aligning blockchains with the GDPR privacy requirements
is the use of blockchains only for storing a timestamp and a
hash that point to the actual information held off-chain [73],
[74]. Therefore, when information needs to be amended or
deleted only the fact that the specific content version existed
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at a given point in time will remain in the blockchain. Bearing
in mind that by using the stored hash alone the original content
cannot be reconstructed, this workaround seems to resolve
the blockchain’s immutability collision with the RtbF rather
elegantly. Indeed, off-chaining techniques so far are considered
to be key tools in blockchain-based application engineering as
they present significant benefits, such as reduced blockchain
data storage requirements, and hence fewer scalability issues,
and GDPR compliance [73], [55]. As a matter of fact, a
recently conducted study [59] among experts concluded that
blockchains could be indeed compliant with the privacy by
design principles of the GDPR, and consequently with the
RtbF, by employing these kind of off-chaining techniques. On
the downside, however, these techniques move the responsi-
bility of robust, distributed data storage to other protocols like
the IPFS [75], while they introduce complexity and additional
delays. Furthermore, they have been criticised for decreasing
blockchains’ security by introducing more attack vectors [76],
[77]. But most importantly, these solutions do not avoid
the burden of having to remove the hash pointers from the
blockchain since hashed data are pseudonymous, not anony-
mous, and therefore need to be protected [65]. For instance,
hashed data may reveal sensitive personal information either
when combined with other available information or when they
are subject to dictionary attacks.
Another alternative solution for complying blockchains with
the RtbF is to have the data stored in the blockchain in an
encrypted form, and when the user asks to delete personal
information forgetting or deleting the encryption key will
make the data inaccessible, i.e. no retrievable. Although some
experts argue that in the case of the blockchain inaccessibility
equals deletion, this is not the opinion of the data protection
authorities such as the French CNIL which explained that,
strictly speaking, this approach is not an actual erasure [66].
Another limitation of this solution stems from the difficulty
in managing the decryption keys among many parties that
need access to the data. Furthermore, there is always the
case that personal data to become unreadable or available
to everyone when the key is either lost or becomes ac-
cidentally known [78], [64], [79]. Taken into account that
data shall remain encrypted across their life cycle, a further
limitation derives from the rapid advancements in quantum
computing which, according to experts, is going to break
most encryption schemes used nowadays [80], [81], [82],
[83]. To avoid information be susceptible to decryption once
quantum computers become available, sensitive data need to be
protected in the long term by using symmetric algorithms with
long key lengths. However, such a choice would have a severe
impact on the storage requirements of the designed blockchain
systems. Unless fully homomorphic encryption or some form
of malleable encryption schemes is used, the processing of
these data will also be impossible. But even then, the extra
burden of processing and querying encrypted data would have
a severe impact on the performance of the blockchain system
[84].
Blockchain pruning is proposed as a way to remove data
from blockchains. In blockchain pruning, old transactions
and blocks are deleted after a predefined amount of time,
whereas old block headers containing the hashed version of
the removed block data are maintained to ensure the integrity
and security of the blockchain. While originally pruning aimed
at compressing the blockchain size on the assumption that
historical data are not required, it is argued that it can also
offer an increased level of user privacy since old transactions
might not be locatable. Accordingly, it can serve regulatory
requirements allowing the old transactions to be forgotten from
the network [85], [55], [86]. In this respect, a cryptocurrency
scheme called the “mini-blockchain” has been proposed as
a pruning alternative to current blockchain implementations
[87]. The proposed scheme eliminates the need for a full
blockchain by unlinking transactions, and therefore it allows
all transactions to be discarded after a safe amount of time
has elapsed. Obviously, when nodes discard the old blocks,
they do not discard the block headers which are stored in a
separate “proof-chain” to maintain the long term blockchain
history. Although blockchain pruning meets scalability and
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expense of the security since, even when old block headers
are maintained, truncating blockchain’s history yields to a
decreased security [55]. Pruning has also been criticised for
its weak enforceability as there is not any guarantee that all
nodes will choose not to store the full chain. Nonetheless,
it has been foreseen that pruning may be an appropriate
solution for permissioned blockchain frameworks where the
operating environment is more easily controlled and adjusted
[88]. Yet, the idea of pruning in public blockchains remains
controversial, and it is nowadays an active field of research
[89].
B. Removing blockchain’s immutability
Much has been written on the advantages and disadvantages
of having a mutable blockchain, i.e. a blockchain whose
content can be edited or deleted. While for crypto proponents
the idea seems repulsive as it eradicates the blockchain’s
append-only and censorship-resistance nature, for business
technocrats the idea seems rather reasonable as it may adapt
blockchains to enterprises’ requirements and constraints. De-
spite the arguments on both sides of the debate, the technical
implementation for introducing mutability to blockchains is
not an easy task. Technologically speaking, the research on
removing blockchain’s immutability while preserving security
is still in infant stages. Yet, some interesting cryptographic and
innovative proposals towards this end are discussed below.
Reversing transactions in fraudulent or exceptional cases
was discussed among bitcoin developers and blockchain
thinkers even from the early days of cryptocurrency boom
[90]. However, since bitcoin was built by design as being
immutable for security purposes, crypto supporters were not
in favour of such an option. Reversecoin however, was the
first altcoin that attempted to reverse transactions within a
timeout period [91]. Its idea was to enable users to seamlessly
transact with their online wallets and fall back to an offline
wallet if their online account gets hacked [92]. Reversecoin
worked by setting two different kinds of accounts: Standard
Accounts, which are like bitcoin accounts; and Vault Accounts,
which are like bank savings accounts. Each vault account has
a configurable timeout and is backed by two key pairs, one
online and one offline. Only the online key pair is needed
to transfer coins from a vault, and the resulting transactions
are confirmed after they live in blockchain for the timeout
period. During this period, one can reverse those transactions
by using the offline key pair and restore the coins in case the
transaction originated by a malicious user. Additionally, all
reverted transactions remained untouched in the blockchain
history so can be publicly viewed. Unfortunately, although
reversecoin’s original idea was rather appealing, the project
did not enjoy widespread acceptance.
The first technical proposal that actually challenged
blockchain’s immutability is the one published by Ateniese
et al. [79]. The authors proposed the replacement of the hash
function that connects each block to the previous one with
an evolution of the standard chameleon hash. A chameleon
hash is a cryptographic hash function that contains a trapdoor,
and the knowledge of this trapdoor allows collisions to be
generated efficiently [93]. While in a standard chameleon hash
collisions must be kept private since the trapdoor can be
extracted from a single collision, in the proposed improved
design it is safe to reveal any number of collisions. With the
knowledge of the trapdoor key, it is possible to efficiently find
collisions and thus replace the content of the blocks. Thereby,
knowing the key, any redaction of the blockchain is possible,
including deletion, modification, and insertion of any number
of blocks. The proposed system also leaves an immutable
“scar” to indicate when any blocks have been altered, main-
taining thus auditability and transparency. Researchers’ main
idea was to have the trapdoor key be secretly shared among
some fixed set of users that are in charge of redacting the
blockchain content in specific and exceptional circumstances.
For example, the key could be in the hands of miners, a
centralised auditor, or shares of the key could be distributed
among several authorities, so that unanimous agreement must
be reached to make any changes.
Unavoidably, the announcement of the first redactable
blockchain was met with widespread derision while provoked
a lot of agitation and scepticism among blockchain believers
and cryptocurrency advocates who even argued that an editable
blockchain is actually similar to a database [94], [95], [96],
[97]. They were further claiming that having to trust a set
of specific participating authorities, such as banks, to edit
the blockchain contents invalidates the decentralised nature
of blockchains and defeats the very benefit of this technology
[55], [37]. In addition, they argued that a redactable blockchain
opens up the financial systems to possible fraudulent activ-
ities because the disclosure of the trapdoor key makes the
blockchain vulnerable to malicious attacks and decreases its
security [98]. Despite the criticism, the authors teamed up
with Accenture, a big consulting firm, to develop a prototype
adapted and refined for permissioned environments based on
Hyperledger. Notwithstanding the author’s argument that the
solution is compatible with current blockchain frameworks,
both permissionless and permissioned, sharing the key needed
to edit a blockchain to a finite number of trusted nodes renders
the solution suitable only for permissioned settings. However,
as stated in [37], in permissioned blockchains mutations can
be performed much more easily based on a voting process,
albeit less optimised in terms of performance.
Another technical solution for forgetting data stored in
blockchains is proposed in [99] where a mutable blockchain
that enables the deletion and modification of blockchain con-
tent is described. The proposed design leverages the consensus
mechanisms of traditional blockchains to vote on alternate
versions of blockchain history. It does so through the intro-
duction of mutable transactions which represent transactions
sets that contain various possible versions of transactions. In
a transaction set, only one of the transactions is specified
as active, while all the others are inactive alternatives. All
modifications are performed using transactions of a special
type, meta-transactions, which are issued by users or smart
contracts and are verified by validators. Mutations are also
subject to access control policies specified by the transaction
senders. These policies define who, and under which circum-
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versions of data records, and validators verify their conditions.
To hide alternative history versions, the blockchain relies on
encryption: all possible transaction versions are encrypted
using transaction-specific keys whereas only the decryption
keys for the active records are made available. To adapt the
setting to the constraints of permissionless blockchains, the
authors use a secret sharing scheme to split the transaction-
specific keys into shares and distribute those shares among
the validators, which can only reconstruct the entire key if a
sufficient number of shares are collected. However, as the au-
thors state, this scheme adds significant performance overhead
and limits the verification enforcement of some transaction
properties. Additionally, while the proposed blockchain offers
solutions to the patching of vulnerable smart contracts and
the elimination of abusive content from blockchains, it also
presents some limitations that hinder its wide acceptance as a
forgetting mechanism in permissionless settings. For instance,
once an active transaction becomes inactive due to mutation,
and therefore its decryption key is not served anymore by
validators, local copies of keys may remain stored locally
by clients. As a result, the reconstruction of an inactive, i.e.
“forgotten”, record is still possible.
Criticising the above proposal for allowing a malicious
user in a public blockchain to simply not include a mutation
for his transaction, or even to set a policy where only he
himself can mutate the transaction, the authors of [100]
present a redactable blockchain that does not rely on heavy
cryptographic tools and is suitable for permissionless settings.
Its protocol uses a consensus-based voting based on a PoW
and is parameterized by a policy that dictates the requirements
and constraints for the redactions. Any user can propose the
edit operations but they are only performed if approved by the
blockchain policy (e.g., voted by the majority). Moreover, the
protocol offers accountability for edit operations as any edit
in the chain can be publicly verified. Nonetheless, although
the proof-of-concept implementation of the proposed scheme
presents only a tiny overhead in the chain validation when
compared to an immutable one, the proposed permissionless
blockchain operates on the assumption that the majority of the
miners in the network are honest, and they behave rationally
when they vote to either accept or reject the edit requests.
In [76] a memory flexible blockchain framework tailored to-
wards IoT networks is presented. The framework allows users
to modify, compress, or completely remove their transactions
from blockchains while it preserves transactions’ consistency.
This is achieved by computing the hash of the block over the
hashes of its constituted transactions and not of their contents,
thereby allowing a transaction to be removed from a block
without impacting the hash consistency checks. In particular,
for each transaction stored in the blockchain, a specific value
is calculated as the signed hash of a secret only the entity
generating the transaction knows. To remove a stored transac-
tion, the user has to prove that it has previously generated that
transaction by including in the remove transaction the hashes
used to generate the secret of the transaction to be removed and
the encrypted form of the hashed secret using her public key.
When a transaction is removed, while its content is removed
from the blockchain, the hash of its content and the hash of
its preceding transaction remain stored in the blockchain to
ensure blockchain consistency and auditability. To facilitate
the removal process, multiple agents are introduced to reduce
the packet and processing overhead associated with multiple
memory optimisation methods used. Each agent is identified
by a unique public key which is certified by a Certificate
Authority (CA) to verify its identity. Moreover, for maintaining
consistency among transactions and for auditing purposes, a
shared read-only central database known as a blackboard and
managed centrally by a Blackboard Manager Agent (BMA)
is employed. Multiple replications of the blackboard exist to
reduce the risk of single point of failure and to ensure scalabil-
ity. Overall, the proposed framework provides a solid technical
framework suitable for compressing, modifying and removing
transaction data from blockchains in IoT environments. Yet,
since it relies heavily on centralised entities (CA and BMA)
for the management of its key functionalities (agents and
blackboard), it significantly deviates from a fully decentralised
solution.
In another research, the problem of preserving hash-based
integrity when deleting transactions from blockchains is tack-
led [101]. The author describes a data structure, a block matrix,
and an algorithm that allow the safe deletion of arbitrary
records while preserving hash-based integrity assurance that
other blocks remain unchanged. However, the solution has
been thus far focused only to permissioned blockchains to
ensure their transaction integrity and their compliance with the
erasing requirements of the RtbF [102]. Nevertheless, the idea
appears rather appealing as it delves into a core blockchain
element, its data structure.
Similarly to blockchain transaction data and contrary to
traditional distributed applications that can be patched when
bugs are detected, smart contracts living on the blockchain are
also irreversible and immutable [103]. In other words, once
smart contracts’ code is migrated to the blockchain network
there is no way to patch bugs or alter their functionalities.
Smart contracts are not removed from the blockchain when
their use has come to an end. Instead, they are part of the
history of the blockchain and probably retained by most nodes.
Even when developers think in advance a way to disable
them manually, by inserting ad-hoc code in the contracts, or
automatically, by calling self-destruct or suicide functions, the
smart contracts are still present but unresponsive [104], [105].
Yet, smart contracts’ immutability refers only to their actual
code and not to their state which is mostly set from the state
of their variables and functions. In fact, in ethereum network,
while variables’ state can change freely, the history of storage
variables in contracts is permanently stored. Furthermore, the
functions in the contracts’ code are immutable once they are
deployed to the blockchain. This immutability is exploited
by decentralized applications (DApps) to store some data
persistently, and in some cases to certify data ownership and
provenance, e.g. to write the hash of a document on the
blockchain so that they can prove document existence and
integrity [104]. However, due to their immutable nature of
smart contracts, their correctness has been identified as a
critical factor for their proper and safe behaviour [103], [106].
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Furthermore, acknowledging that, in contrast to their analogue
counterparts, smart contracts’ immutability does not allow
traditional tools of contract law for termination, rescission,
modification and reformation, to be applied successfully to
smart contracts, researchers are arguing for a new set of
standards to alter and undo smart contracts in order to ensure
that the traditional tools achieve their original (contract law)
goals when applied to the blockchain technology [107].
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The controversy over the immutability of blockchain pro-
tocols has been given considerable prominence recently due
to the adoption of the GDPR and, most importantly, due to
the RtbF which foresees the retroactive erasure of personal
data upon request and from all available places to which
they have been disseminated. Immutability, on the other
hand, is fundamental to blockchain’s security as it forbids
tampering with blockchain data and therefore it facilitates
the single, globally accepted view of events among non-
trusted participants. In other words, immutability supports
the possibility of decentralized trust in inherently trustless
interactions. For cryptocurrency activists and blockchain pro-
ponents even simply questioning the immutable nature of
blockchain is tantamount to heresy [95] and therefore they
regard the RtbF as an obstacle to the widespread adoption of
blockchain technology. On the opposite side, privacy advocates
look upon blockchains’ immutability as a risk to people’s
data protection and privacy rights. For enterprise technocrats,
however, incorporating limited mutability within permissioned
blockchain systems, subject to certain conditions, can strike
the right balance between preserving blockchain’s key features
and adapting it for real-world requirements [108]. In this per-
spective, the recent advancements on introducing mutability,
based on strict, pre-approved rules, appeals both to regulators
and to enterprises [61].
In view of the above, the number of public authorities that
have started exploring the use of blockchain for their admin-
istration and services is rising [109], [110], [111]. In 2017,
DG TAXUD, the EU General Directorate responsible for EU
policies on taxation and customs, started exploring blockchain
technology within the customs domain [112], while a year ago
21 EU Member States plus Norway agreed to sign a declara-
tion creating the European Blockchain Partnership (EBP) and
to cooperate in the establishment of a European Blockchain
Services Infrastructure (EBSI) that will support the delivery of
cross-border digital public services [113]. At about the same
time, the European Commission with the support of the Euro-
pean Parliament launched the EU Blockchain Observatory and
Forum with the purpose to encourage governments, industry
and citizens to benefit from blockchain opportunities [114].
Similarly, the OECD has begun investigating the benefits and
risks of blockchain for economies and societies [115], [116],
while the UN is gradually embracing blockchain technology
[117]. In the banking sector, the use of digital currencies
based on blockchain technology is progressing rapidly as many
major banks have already announced blockchain projects to
build new digital currencies [118], [119], [120]. Enterprises
also consistently engage and invest in the blockchain technol-
ogy [121], [122], [123], [124]. Notwithstanding these global
initiatives towards a blockchain-enabled era, the blockchain’s
mass-market adoption is not expected any time soon [28]. In
particular, experts believe that blockchain is now where the
web was in 1994 [125]. Indeed, while according to Gartner
blockchain is one of the emerged trends in 2018, it is expected
to reach a healthy, stable plateau at least in five to 10 years
[126].
In spite of blockchain’s slow integration into real-life ap-
plications, the extent to which blockchain’s incompatibility
with data protection and privacy rights occupies scientists
and businesses is remarkable. In that respect, and towards
researching methods and techniques to accomplish compli-
ance of blockchain protocols with the RtbF, several technical
solutions have been put forward. The proposed solutions
comprise technical methods broadly used nowadays to bypass
the blockchain’s collision with the RtbF, as well as crypto-
graphic and other advanced methods aiming at conditionally
removing the immutability of the blockchain. In this paper, we
attempted, on the one hand, to summarise all these innovative
methods and the state-of-the-art techniques and, on the other
hand, to provide a comprehensive review of their benefits and
limitations when applied in the wild to either permissioned
or permissionless blockchain frameworks. In this regard, it is
our firm belief that this work will be proved valuable both to
industry and to academia.
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